Liberalism and Culture: The legitimacy of the "Cultural Defense" by Sivén, Christa
Lund University  STVM11  
Department of Political Science  Tutor: Anders Sannerstedt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liberalism and Culture 
The legitimacy of the “Cultural Defense” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christa Sivén 
 
 Abstract 
The thesis examines selected “cultural conflicts” that can be said to exist in 
majority/minority relations within the context of Western liberal democratic 
societies. A normative analysis regarding when it is justified for a minority to 
claim certain rights with reference to culture is conducted. Four controversial 
examples are included: The ban of religious symbols in public schools in France 
(the Muslim headscarf being the specific symbol discussed), polygamy, female 
circumcision and underage/child marriage. The examples presented are treated as 
cultural traditions that serve to exemplify how the normative guidelines in the 
study regarding the “cultural defense” can be applied in practice. The value 
hierarchy in the study is constructed using a theoretical framework based on 
liberal theory. The central premise that the study is based on is the liberal 
principle of freedom, and the importance of culture for said freedom. A central 
argument in the study is that acceptance of cultural variation is crucial in every 
society with the ambition to call itself liberal; it is also evident in the study that 
sometimes when it comes to cultural dilemmas in the West, the concept of 
“Western values” have been inaccurately equalized with the values of liberalism.   
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 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is twofold. The introductory part consists of an 
empirical analysis of some challenges that exist in majority-minority 
relations in Western liberal democracies. The empirical examples chosen 
are from the United States and France. The focus is put on giving an 
account of examples of specific controversial issues where there is, or can 
be said to be, a clash of norms or normative principles between the 
majority and a minority culture. On the basis of the initial empirical part of 
the thesis a normative analysis is performed in the second part of the study. 
The aim of the normative analysis is to construct guidelines consisting of a 
set of criteria in order to present a normative stance on when cultural 
variance in the context of a Western liberal democracy should be accepted, 
i.e. when it is justified for a minority culture, or more specifically, 
individuals belonging to a minority, to claim a certain right with reference 
to culture, and consequently when it is not justified. 
The set of criteria range from: Cultural variance must be accepted 
when... To: Cultural variance cannot be accepted when… The four main 
examples of when conflicting normative views can occur/exist between 
the majority and a minority culture within the context of Western liberal 
democracies that are included are: 
 
1. The ban of religious symbols in public schools in France 
2. Polygamy 
3. Female circumcision 
4. Underage/child marriage  
 
The “normative conflicts” between cultures that are included are examples 
chosen in order to illustrate the normative stance taken on the basis of the 
specific normative premises in the thesis, and it will be evident that they 
fall under different categories. Further, it can be argued that when 
formulating any normative criteria, there is always somewhat of a gray 
middle area of the scale that is most problematic to define; this will be 
addressed in the analysis as well. 
The ban of religious symbols within public schools in France 
includes all religious symbols; however there have been controversy and 
claims that the purpose with the ban was mainly aimed towards the 
Muslim community and the headscarf in particular. One argument that has 
been used to justify the ban is that the headscarf is oppressive to women 
and that religious symbols should not be allowed in schools within the 
public education system in a secularized country. However, one could 
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 argue that it is a direct violation of liberal human rights to ban someone 
from wearing a headscarf or another religious symbol to a public school or 
workplace. It can also be argued that the question of certain religious or 
cultural symbols within the public education system or in public work 
places lands in the “gray middle area” of what should be accepted, or that 
it should not be accepted at all, and this will be addressed in the thesis as 
well. However, it will be evident that the above example with the religious 
symbols land in the “when cultural variance must be accepted” category of 
the scale in this thesis. The headscarf and the other contingent symbols 
that will be included in the thesis are treated partly as religious symbols 
but also as cultural symbols since there is variation to if Muslim women 
wear the headscarf or not, especially when it comes to immigrant women 
within the West. There is also variation from country to country within the 
Muslim world so within the context of this thesis it cannot be said that the 
headscarf e.g. is only a religious symbol, but also a cultural symbol. 
The three remaining examples (polygamy, female circumcision and 
underage marriage) will be treated as strictly cultural traditions, and not as 
religious traditions. Because even if it is possible to argue that the 
traditions are practiced to a higher extent within some religions than 
within others (where the traditions are unacceptable), it cannot within the 
context of this thesis be said that any religion unanimously advocates any 
of the above traditions. Thus the argument in this thesis is that the 
traditions are practiced, as well as seen as acceptable or not, to a varying 
degree, not from religion to religion, but from culture to culture. 
The example of polygamy is included as an example that is very 
controversial and is not accepted in Western democracies today. However, 
it will be evident in this thesis that according to the theoretical value logic 
that the study is based on, it is possible to argue that polygamy as well 
lands in the category of cultural variance that should be accepted in a 
liberal society. Why the question of if a minority culture, or more 
specifically individuals belonging to a culture that views polygamy as 
acceptable, should be allowed to practice polygamy within the context of a 
liberal democracy lands in the above mentioned category will be evident 
on the basis of the normative premises that are detailed in the main part of 
the study. 
The two additional main examples (female circumcision and 
underage marriage) are included with the purpose to illustrate the 
extremity of the other end of the scale, i.e. what cannot and should not be 
acceptable in a liberal society. 
When performing a normative analysis and in constructing a set of 
criteria as in this study, it means that a hierarchy of values is constructed 
(Badersten 2006:31). The theoretical base in the study is value theory and 
a core premise in the study is that culture can either sustain or constrain 
individual freedom. Thus, the central core principle that the normative 
premises within the scale of what should and what should not be 
acceptable with reference to culture are based on the liberal principle of 
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 human rights and liberties with the intrinsic value of freedom, as will be 
defined in the introductory part of the study. Further, the normative logic 
that the analysis is based on is in a sense deontological, i.e. an act should 
be valued with regard to what the duties or responsibilities of (in this case) 
the liberal society are (Ibid. 15). The consequence of this deontological 
logic is in the context of the study that cultural variance should only be 
accepted when the premise of liberal human rights is fulfilled, including 
political and civil rights, as defined in the analysis. The ontological stance 
in the study is that values and value-judgments exist and are real in the 
sense that values influence humans and how we act. However, values 
often have a limited validity, e.g. certain values are valid within a certain 
context (in this case the context of a liberal democratic society). 
Consequently, values are dependent on the human context. In this sense 
the ontological stance is a value relativistic one, this stance means though 
that it still is highly possible as well as relevant to study values in a 
scientific manner (Ibid. 65). It can even be said that value conflicts and 
normative dilemmas make up what politics essentially are about, since the 
politics of a society ultimately is about prioritizing between differing 
values (Ibid. 29). 
1.1 Research question 
What are some of the (controversial) challenges in majority/minority 
relations within the context of a Western liberal democratic society? When 
is it within the above context justified for a minority to claim certain rights 
with reference to cultural variance? 
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 2 Previous research on the subject   
“Minority rights and the relevance of 
Culture” 
  2.1 Political Philosophy 
Within the field of political philosophy, the existing literature regarding 
normative argumentation for minority rights is growing. According to 
Patten (2009) the scientific debate concerning the moral justification of 
language rights for example, often revolves around the categorization of 
rights (Patten 2009:103). The five different categories often referred to in 
this context are: 
 
 
1. Toleration rights 
2. Accommodation rights 
3. Context-of-choice rights 
4. End-state rights 
5. Fairness rights 
(Ibid.) 
 
 
Toleration rights simply mean that individuals are protected from 
government interference in their private life and within the private sphere, 
within the civil society e.g. Toleration rights are often viewed as the 
easiest category of rights to justify. Accommodation rights run along the 
same line, however the difference is that accommodation rights concern 
situation that arise in the public sphere, e.g. in the example regarding 
language rights, an accommodation right can be the right to an interpreter 
when standing trial, if the accused does not understand the language of the 
majority (Patten 2009:108-110). Context-of-choice rights relate to the 
notion that individuals should have the right to make informed decisions 
about their lives, the context of choice is supplied by the culture that an 
individual belongs to and is crucial for the personal autonomy. The three 
above categories of rights are all in line with liberalism and the 
argumentation for them follows a “liberal logic” of basic civil rights that 
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 will be used in the normative argumentation further on in this study. The 
End-state argument on the other hand says that the mere fact that a culture 
(or a language that the speakers of it are strongly attached to) is 
disappearing is reason enough for the culture to enjoy certain protective 
rights. This argument is clearly not in line with liberalism or liberal 
theory, since it means that also illiberal cultures should be granted 
minority rights (Ibid. 115-117). In this way, end-state rights are 
fundamentally different from the other three categories mentioned above. 
Lastly, fairness rights can be considered to belong to the same category as 
end-state rights, however there is a difference. According to the fairness 
argument, the justification of a right is based on the claim that without it, 
there would be unfairness in the social process that determines the 
availability of options for individuals speaking a minority language e.g. 
(Ibid. 120).  
Depending on what rights are viewed as of most importance, then 
by constructing a value hierarchy, different approaches for argumentation 
are possible, which can provide the theoretical framework for normative 
justification of certain minority rights. The above categories can also be 
connected to what within political philosophy often is referred to as the 
moralism of multiculturalism. It is widely considered within the context of 
political philosophy that morality (i.e. the appliance of moral judgments to 
political actions) is relevant to politics ( Ivison 2005:171). Ivison identifies 
three kinds of moralism:  
 
1. Undue abstraction 
2. Unjustified moralism 
3. Impotent moralism 
   (Ibid.) 
 
Ivason further writes that political philosophers often are subject to the 
criticism of abstracting too much from the context of political action and 
by this undue abstraction can lead to depolitizing. Further, theories of 
moralism can be too abstract and also be overly moralistic about the 
capacities of the people to whom the moral arguments are addressed to, 
hence it can be difficult to live up to and implement the idealizations of 
moral theories (Ibid.). Unjustified moralism is according to Ivason when 
the state through public policy imposes moral judgments that infringes on 
the basic freedom and dignity of the citizens, this can never be morally 
justified and generates frustration as well as resentment among the 
citizens. It is the inversion of this phenomena that Ivason calls impotent 
moralism, i.e. the effect of the unjustified moralism, which leads to the 
desire to strike back at the forces that have denied you freedom and basic 
political rights (Ibid. 171-172). 
Each of the above mentioned moralisms have been featured in 
recent criticisms of the political theory and public policy of 
multiculturalism (Ibid.) and can enable normative argumentation for either 
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 the defense of special minority rights, or the rejection of them, on the basis 
of which moralism is applied. 
 2.2  Political science: The liberal tradition 
The individualistic perspective of liberalism can be said to be a direct 
contradiction to the idea of group rights for cultural minorities. However, 
there are scholars within the school of liberal theory that challenge this 
idea and therefore there are many dimensions to the scientific debate over 
what role minority rights and culture play for freedom and equality in a 
liberal society. E.g. the three arguably most influential scholars within the 
field of minority rights and liberal multiculturalism are Will Kymlicka, 
Bhikhu Parekh and Charles Taylor, all of whom identify as liberals, but 
have made differing theoretical attempts to develop a liberal 
multiculturalism (Tempelman 1999:19). While Kymlicka argues for a 
redefinition of liberalism from within when it comes to multiculturalism, 
both Taylor and Parekh argue in their work that we must go “beyond 
liberalism”. Taylor e.g. complains that liberalism is “inhospitable to 
difference”  (Loobuyck 2005:108).  
A key issue within the scientific debate is the question of whether 
group rights should be practiced or not, as a possible means to protect 
minority cultures and cultural norms. There is a conflict within 
contemporary liberal theory as well as between the liberal and democratic 
perspectives in this debate (Kane in Carter & Stokes eds. 2002:97). The 
two arguments defenders of group rights often refer to are that they serve 
the purpose of either protecting minority cultures or to promote greater 
democratic inclusion (Ibid.). Scholars like Kymlicka (1995) e.g. argue that 
group rights for certain minorities are a necessity in order to achieve 
freedom and equality in Western liberal democracies, because cultural 
identity and norms are so deeply rooted and by this play a key role for the 
liberal principle of freedom (Kymlicka 1995:194-195). Kymlicka attempts 
to prove that liberalism and the principle of individualism is consistent 
with group rights, and that it is the right of minority cultures to gain 
possibilities to nurture and protect their culture and cultural norms. 
According to this view a cultural norm within the majority culture should 
be to encourage the protection of (at least certain) minority cultures. 
Although this view raises many questions, e.g. how it can be considered as  
equality if the cultural norm is that only certain groups are entitled to 
group rights? E.g. Kymlicka only promotes group rights for national 
minorities and indigenous people, and not for immigrants. The work of 
Charles Taylor also serves as an example of the view that cultural minority 
groups deserve special protection, on the basis that cultural identity is 
deeply rooted and provides the members of a cultural community the basis 
of their identity (Tempelman 1999:19). Taylor stresses the importance of 
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 real recognition in the sense that the majority culture must show respect to 
minority cultures by communication and presuming that the minority 
cultures are valuable not only for the members themselves, but also for the 
liberal society as a whole. Hence, intercultural dialogue is essential. 
However, all cultures are not equally acceptable, Taylor is very clear 
about the fact that only cultures that respect the basic human rights as well 
as the liberal rights of liberty, free practice of religion, free speech etc 
should be accepted by the liberal society. The communication across 
cultural boundaries that Taylor advocates is also central in the work of 
Bhikhu Parekh. Parekh goes as far as to stress that said communication is 
the most important form of cultural recognition and that to what extent 
cultural variance can or should be accepted in a liberal society should be 
decided by means of an open dialogue where both “sides” are allowed to 
defend their standpoint. 
Although, it is unavoidable in Perekh's view that the rules of the 
dialogue are guided as well as made by the public culture of the majority 
society, and if the debate stands at a standstill the public values of the 
majority tend to rule the outcome (Ibid. 24), which can be seen as 
problematic. There is also the problem of what to do when a minority 
culture is not willing to participate in public dialogue and defense of their 
normative values.  
A further advocate of multiculturalism and the importance of 
culture is Robert E Goodin (2006). Goodin has (on the basis of C.B. 
McPherson’s famous protective and self-developmental models of liberal 
democracy) two different models of what he calls liberal multiculturalism 
(Goodin 2006:289). The first model is what Goodin calls “protective 
multiculturalism”, according to this model special minority rights (such as 
group rights) are a requirement in a liberal society in order to ensure that 
cultural minorities do not suffer from oppression by the majority culture 
(Ibid.). This model bares many similarities to the before mentioned liberal 
multiculturalism advocated by Kymlicka e.g. The second model developed 
by Goodin is what he calls “polygot multiculturalism”. In this model, 
instead of protection of minorities, the emphasis is on inclusion and 
welcoming of minority cultures into the majority culture. This does not in 
any way mean assimilation, only that the majority can expand its “context 
of choice” by welcoming minority cultures into its own culture (Ibid 289-
290). In contrast to the model of “protective multiculturalism” group 
rights are not compatible with the model of “polygot multiculturalism”. In 
a sense it can be said to be a matter of making a difference between what 
is considered as political demands for recognition that are egalitarian and 
concerned with the elimination of oppression and disrespect on the one 
hand, and demands for esteem/affirmation on the other hand (Mcbride 
2009:96-97). The rejection of what Mcbride (2009) calls demands for 
esteem or affirmation also means a rejection of special rights for 
minorities. However, it can always be discussed where exactly the line 
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 is/should be drawn between what constitutes an egalitarian demand and 
what in its turn is perceived as demands for esteem/affirmation. 
The before mentioned attempts by Kymlicka, Taylor, Parekh et.al. 
to develop multiculturalist theories including certain rights for minorities 
has not surprisingly been widely criticized by many other liberals. Brian 
Barry (2001) e.g. accuses them of denying the ideals of the Enlightenment 
and thus being anti-liberal (Barry 2001:5).  This does not mean that Barry 
is against pluralism or diversity, however he speaks of liberal instead of 
multicultural measures, thus Barry defines multiculturalism as something 
that per definition transcends liberalism in order to accommodate cultural 
diversity (Loobuyck 2005:109-110). If this definition is used “liberal 
multiculturalism” would be a contradictio in terminis (Ibid. 110).  
 A further argument that Barry presents against special rights for 
minorities includes that if groups or individuals are given special rights 
with reference to culture, there is a possibility that these rights can be 
abused, i.e. the argument “It's a part of my culture” can be used when 
demanding illiberal rights (Barry 2001:252-254). However, if the 
legislation of the state includes distinct criteria for when a demand is 
justified and when it is not because it goes against liberal values, the risk 
of abuse of the legislation concerning cultural rights could be minimized. 
Hence, it is (at least in theory) possible to get around this argument and 
claim that since the risk of abuse can be limited, the validity of the 
argument Barry makes is decreased. 
A key factor for what kind of multiculturalism is proposed is how 
the concept of cultural identity is perceived (Tempelman 1999:17). Within 
liberal theory one can find three main types of collective identities referred 
to: The first type being primordiality where identity is based on 
unchangeable features that are perceived to be given by nature. Hence, a 
group is seen as a homogeneous unity and strangers are perceived as 
outsiders that are fundamentally different from the group and therefore 
perceived as naturally not comparable with the group and even dangerous 
and a threat to the collective (Ibid. 18). The second type of identity 
referred to is the civic construction of a collective identity. This conveys a 
constructivist type of identity where the core of the collective is not seen 
as natural, but as a historically developed construction based on shared 
traditions, rules and institutional arrangements (Ibid.). In this view the 
boundaries are more diffuse and undefined and outsiders or “strangers” are 
not automatically perceived as threats or incomparably different. The third 
type of identity referred to is the universal mode where the collective 
identity is based on universalistic codes that tie the community together, 
meaning that the collective is not dependent on any natural ties or 
traditions, but instead the community is unquestionably “given” since the 
universalistic codes link the identity to a “...deeper and imperishable realm 
behind the fluid and mundane order (Ibid.). A core principle within the 
universal mode is that boundaries can easily be crossed through 
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 communication and education, because everyone (at least in principle) is 
invited to do so (Ibid.) 
Of course, cultural identity can be dynamic as well as difficult to 
define in practice, however, for the purpose of a valid scientific 
argumentation it is of importance to define the concept “cultural identity” 
and be clear about how cultural communities are perceived in the study. 
 2.3 Feminism 
Feminism traditionally opposes group rights and perhaps the most famous 
feminist argument against group rights comes from Susan Okin who writes 
that there are many minority groups that are antifeminist, and where the 
claims of a minority culture strongly clash with the norm of gender 
equality that exists in the West, and she argues that this is a strong 
argument against all kinds of group rights on the basis of culture (Okin 
1999:9-11). The main premise Okin bases her theory on is the same as 
other feminist scholars like Norris & Inglehart (2003) e.g. Namely that 
culture and cultural norms are a key factor for to what extent gender 
equality exists in a society, because most cultures traditionally have a 
principal aim to control women by men (Ibid. 13). Hence, specific cultural 
rights should not according to this view be accepted in a Western liberal 
society. 
Okin also claims that as a rule, the defense of cultural practice 
often has a greater impact on the lives of women and girls than on those of 
men and boys. Okin stresses that “Religious or cultural groups are 
particularly concerned with “personal law”-the laws of marriage, divorce, 
child custody, division and control of family property, and inheritance.” 
(Ibid.). With this Okin puts a major focus on how culture within the 
private sphere affects the opportunities of freedom for women within the 
public sphere. Because, home is where much of the culture is being passed 
down to the young and the distribution of power and responsibilities at 
home regulates how much women can participate in public parts of 
political and cultural life. This is a key issue for political as well as 
substantial freedom for women according to Okin since it is in the public 
sphere of cultural life that the rules and regulations of both the public life 
and the private life are being made (Ibid.). This can be said for cultural 
minorities and other marginalized groups as well. Without the opportunity 
to participate in political life the voices of minorities will not be heard, 
which means that the question of freedom as well as equality for 
minorities will not even be on the political agenda. 
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  2.4 Conclusion 
 
As evident in the above overview over previous research, different 
scholars have taken a variety of theoretical approaches to the concept of a 
”liberal multiculturalism”. The relevance of political philosophy and the 
connection to moral considerations is also evident when studying material 
within the research subject. The traditionally considered perspective that 
liberalism is a direct contradiction to the idea of minority rights has been 
challenged by three of the most distinguished scholars within the field 
(Kymlicka, Parekh & Taylor), which illustrates the many dimensions of 
the scientific debate regarding minority rights and what role culture plays 
for freedom as well as equality in the liberal society. The answer to this 
question varies and ultimately depends (among other things) on the value 
hierarchy constructed in the research, which e.g. is evident in the included 
feminist argumentation against group rights, since the value of equality 
between men and women is seen as superior to the value of cultural rights 
to minorities. In a way the argument made by Okin is that multiculturalist 
measures are not desirable in a liberal society for the reason that it might 
be harmful to women. This argument stands in contrast to the liberal 
arguments highlighted in the research overview, where there is a 
consensus (regardless of what position the mentioned scholars take 
regarding the question of special rights for minorities) that 
multiculturalism is desirable and benefits not only the relevant minority 
cultures, but also the liberal society as a whole. 
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 3    Theory 
 3.1 Value theory 
The discussion regarding theory of science when it comes to normative 
analysis is highly about which value theory approach is used in the 
analysis (Ibid. 56). Value theory provides the analytical framework for: 
 
1. What the concept of values means? 
2. What ontological status we can ascribe values?  
3. What epistemological status we can ascribe values, i.e. if it is 
possible to study values in a scientific manner or not? 
(Ibid. 56) 
 
The answers to these questions differ and all depend on which value 
theory approach is used. The most relevant theoretical definitions that are 
to be made for the purpose of this study is the ontological as well as 
epistemological stance. The normative analysis in this study is based on 
relativistic value ontology, which means that values are considered to be 
dependent on human ideas and perceptions. In this sense values are very 
real, however they are not independent from the human context. Hence, 
values are subjective rather than objective. Consequently, to claim that a 
certain cultural right is desirable for example, cannot according to the 
relativistic value theory be said to be an objective truth, mere a subjective 
claim (Ibid.61). This answer to the second question above does not mean 
however that the scientific study of values is impossible. On the contrary, 
it is still possible and meaningful to study values in a scientific manner, 
just not objectively in the sense that the concept of values would be 
unaffected or uninfluenced by the human context and who we are, i.e. 
context is key and the epistemological status ascribed to values in this 
study is dependent on the value relativistic ontological stance taken. 
Hence, the criteria that is developed in this study for when cultural 
variance must be accepted and when it cannot be accepted relies entirely 
on the liberal context, which means that liberal theory is the Meta theory 
in the normative analysis. The claims that are made are entirely dependent 
on what is seen as right and just on the basis of the premises presented, 
premises that are based on liberal theory and the liberal principle of human 
rights. It is crucial in this analysis to remember that political and civil 
11 
 rights, or more precisely, how these rights are perceived varies from 
culture to culture and also from time to time (Ibid. 67). Consequently, the 
normative claims that are presented in this analysis are not valid outside of 
the cultural context in which they are made. 
               
 3.2  Liberal Theory applied 
The term ”liberal” has been applied to many different theories within 
many different fields of research (Kymlicka 1989:9). The definition used 
in this thesis is the one used by Will Kymlicka among others, i.e. 
”...liberalism as a normative political philosophy, a set of moral arguments 
about the justification of political action and institutions” (Ibid.) 
One central premise in the liberal theory applied in this study is 
that a liberal view requires freedom for the individuals within the minority 
culture as well as equality between the minority culture and the majority 
culture (Kymlicka 1995:152). This is the main reason why a liberal order 
cannot accommodate nor accept all demands made by cultural minorities, 
e.g. if a minority culture does not want a system where cultural rights are 
tied with the promotion of basic human, political or civil rights for all 
individuals, this is simply not acceptable in a liberal order (Ibid. 153). 
Hence, the premise of equal individual rights is central in the analysis. 
One could ask why it then is even relevant to take culture into 
consideration and argue for acceptance of cultural variance if the answer is 
to simply grant equal rights for all according to the liberal principle. One 
answer is that it completely depends on what we mean with the concept of 
“equal rights for all” and the concept of equality in majority-minority 
relations will be discussed further in the study. Another definition relevant 
for the argumentation in this thesis is that the liberal freedom principle 
includes that the basic liberal rights are to secure the free and informed 
application of justice for all citizens, to the basic structure of society 
(Rawls 1996:334). Without these rights the liberal democratic order 
cannot be secured. The normative argumentation is thus based on that an 
essential interest of liberal political theory is to give an account of what 
people's interests are and treat these interests with equal concern and 
respect (Kymlicka 1989: 13).  Hence, within the concept of this study it 
means that all individuals regardless of their culture should in a liberal 
context have the freedom and opportunity to live their lives as they wish, 
including according to the norms within their culture, as long as this does 
not cause harm or oppression to other individuals, or to their equal right to 
lead their lives as they wish. Put simply this means that the rights of the 
minority should never be denied nor stripped away by the majority as long 
as this premise is fulfilled. This individualistic perspective (which is 
crucial within liberal theory) does not mean that culture does not matter. 
12 
 On the contrary, in concurrence with Will Kymlicka (1995) it is in this 
normative analysis argued that cultural identity is often deeply rooted and 
therefore relevant to study, and that recognition as well as acceptance of 
cultural diversity is important in a modern liberal society. By respecting 
cultural minority rights the freedom of individuals can increase, because 
freedom is intimately linked with (as well as dependent on) culture (Ibid. 
75).  
Thus, a premise in the study that goes in line with the above 
statements is that culture does indeed matter for freedom, equality and 
justice, and that the liberal society should take this into consideration in 
order to function according to liberal principles, it will be argued. We 
ourselves define what gives value to our own lives, and in a liberal society 
we should have this right as long as our actions do not interfere with the 
rights of others. What is valuable for one person in their life might not be 
important to another. Individuals should therefore have the liberty as well 
as the resources to lead their life in accordance with what they value in 
their life (Ibid. 81). In accordance with the value relativistic approach 
applied in this study, these values are entirely dependant on context and 
vary from individual to individual. Simply put, understanding a value is a 
matter of understanding the meanings attached to it by our culture. Which 
is a further argument for why culture matters within the context of 
liberalism (Ibid. 82-83).  
A specific liberty is more or less significant depending on to what 
extent it is involved in, or necessary to the full and informed exercise of 
the freedom principle (Ibid. 335 modified). I.e. the ability to not only be 
able to make decisions for ourselves that maximize a particular value, but 
to also have the ability to question if the certain value even is worth 
pursuing (Kymlicka 1989:11).  The ability to question the traditions of 
ones culture e.g. and have the ability to make informed decisions 
concerning if the traditions are worth keeping. Also, the freedom to exit is 
crucial in the context of a liberal society. It can under no circumstances be 
justified to make an individual live according to certain cultural traditions 
under force. The freedom principle guarantees every individual the right to 
exit a culture, and cultures that are oppressive or do not respect the 
freedom principle of individual autonomy should, as mentioned before, 
not be granted cultural rights. 
The freedom to exit principle is valid regardless of if a culture is 
oppressive or not, individual autonomy means that one is justified to 
pursue one’s life as one wishes, which includes the ability and freedom to 
cross cultural boundaries, hence the concept of a cultural community is in 
this study viewed as a dynamic order that has the ability to change and 
evolve. Individuals can both exit their current, and enter a for them new, 
cultural community and the constructions of the community can change as 
well as intermingle with other cultures. The key factor is that as long as 
the actions of a group or an individual do not infringe upon nor violate the 
rights of others, everyone is always free to be responsible for his/her life 
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 from the inside. It does not matter if someone else has the reason to 
believe that we are making a mistake, or believe that the values we live 
our life according to are wrong, nobody else has the right to lead someone 
else's life from the outside. Part of the above statements include the 
argument that no life goes better when being forced by others to live 
according to values that the individual him/herself does not enforce 
(Kymlicka 1989:12-13). However, this argument is only valid if 
individuals have the ability and cultural conditions to acquire an 
awareness of different views on how to live a good life and also the ability 
to intellectually question and re-examine the different views. This is where 
other liberal values come in, e.g. the right to education, freedom of the 
press etc. 
The argument in this study is that the same conditions that go for 
individuals can also be valid for a group, i.e. a cultural entity. As long as 
the individuals belonging to the group have the right to personal 
autonomy, there is no reason why granting certain rights for minority 
groups would be a contradiction to the liberal principles mentioned above. 
On the contrary, it is in this study argued that granting minority rights can 
be a necessity in order to secure the liberal freedom (with all its 
responsibilities) to individuals belonging to a minority culture. 
Example: Individuals belonging to a minority culture have the right 
to decide for themselves which cultural traditions are worth upholding, 
this means that the majority has no right to penalize the minority for 
unorthodox religious or sexual practices etc, given that the minority 
respects the previously defined conditions regarding the responsibilities 
that go with the freedom principle, i.e. not to violate another persons 
rights. Hence, according to the above principle a normative argument in 
defense of e.g. the right for a minority culture to practice polygamy can be 
justified, as long as it is consenting adults with the ability and the right to 
question the values and beliefs they live their life according to that 
practice the specific cultural tradition. It does not matter how controversial 
polygamy is in the eyes of the majority culture, according to the above 
criteria, the majority does not have the right to impose their values on the 
minority, and does not have the right to strip away the right of the 
minority to live their life according to their values. The example of 
polygamy will be further discussed in upcoming chapters of the study. 
Following the same logic of argumentation based on the above 
liberal principle, neither underage marriage nor female circumcision can 
ever be justified within the context of the liberal society. Both these 
traditions involve children and clearly violate the rights of the individual. 
By the practice of these two cultural traditions the rights of the children 
are violated in a number of ways: 
 
1. Children do not have the full ability to make informed decisions, or 
the ability to question the values and beliefs behind the cultural 
practice. 
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2. Children do not have the ability to ”exit” the culture and the 
traditions also hinder the opportunity of the children to exit the 
culture when they become adults. Circumcision can never be 
reversed and if an individual is already married before entering 
adulthood, the ability to exit the culture is limited. 
 
3. Both traditions often involve physical force and can be classified, 
as abuse as well as violation of the individual autonomy, which 
includes the right to ones own body. 
 
 
These theoretical considerations and the application of them is consistent 
with the logic that the normative argumentation is based on, i.e. the logic 
of deontology. The logic is not applied in its strictest sense and crucial in 
this study is that there lies no universalism in the arguments presented, as 
it often does in deontology. As previously mentioned, context is key in 
this normative study. However, the arguments presented regarding the 
above mentioned liberal rights do follow the deontological logic. The 
argument put forward is that each and everyone should within the concept 
of a liberal society have the right to him/herself lead the life he or she 
wishes, the right to non-interference from others. This right is often 
referred to as a negative right (Badersten 2006:113), and simply put 
means the absence of interference from others (e.g. the majority culture 
wanting to decide how a minority culture should lead their life). However, 
with this right there is a distinct obligation that follows at all times. We 
never have the right to lead our lives so that we impose on the rights or 
freedoms of anyone else, this obligation is as central as the above 
mentioned freedom itself, because if we impose on the right of non-
interference of others, we have imposed on the negative right that the 
freedom principle itself is entirely based on (Ibid.) Since the right to 
freedom as defined like above is a negative right, it merely means that 
everyone should have the right to non-inference. However, the liberal 
principles of freedom that this study is based on as previously defined also 
requires the presence of the positive right that is to be able to actually be 
in charge of one owns life, in this case with the liberal society granting 
cultural rights in order to enable individuals to live their life as they want, 
as long as the rights granted by the liberal society are in line with the 
obligation to respect and never to impose on the rights of others. The 
deontological argument here is that the above obligation must be followed 
at all times, and as long as it is, cultural variance should be accepted by 
the liberal political society.  
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 4 Method 
The quality of research, especially regarding qualitative research attracts a 
lot of attention (Flick 2006:26), not least when it comes to normative 
research method. It can be said that there is a long history of suspicion and 
criticism against the validity and reliability of normative research and 
traditionally normative analysis has been avoided within the field of social 
sciences, my field of political science being no exception. To the extent 
that when forming the idea for this thesis and trying to find suitable 
literature that in a systematic way described and provided guidance in 
theoretical and methodological considerations proved to be quite difficult. 
To this date I am yet to find such a book in English. With this said the 
Swedish book “ Normativ metod: Att studera det önskvärda” (2006), by 
Björn Badersten has proven to be very helpful in guiding me as a 
researcher when formulating the methodological considerations for this 
study. In accordance with Badersten I am inclined to claim that the 
methodological base that normative analysis relies on is not necessarily 
more uncertain than the one of empirical analysis, and that it is merely the 
questions asked (and consequently the answers provided) that differ (Ibid. 
5). 
The method in this thesis consists both of an empirical as well as a 
normative analysis. First an introductory qualitative empirical analysis is 
done, of existing literature within the area of research, i.e. the examples 
selected in order to illustrate the normative stance that is taken in the 
study. The examples that are brought up are the ban of religious symbols 
in public schools in France, polygamy, female circumcision and 
underage/child marriage. The sole purpose of this empirical part of the 
study is to illustrate some examples of potential controversial issues 
between the majority and a minority. The empirical examples provide a 
necessary tool in order to illustrate the criteria that is formulated in the 
normative part of the study and is consequently suitable in order to answer 
the research question. The chosen examples are from the United States and 
France, with the reason that aside from both countries being Western 
liberal democracies, the existing material on the cultural conflicts chosen 
is largely from/on either the United States or France, because the specific 
“cultural conflicts” analyzed in this study have been on the political 
agenda in recent years, with much public and political controversy, in 
these two countries.  
The use of existing material like literature is necessary for this 
study, as in (arguably) most qualitative studies, in order to use insights and 
information as context knowledge (Flick 2006:59). It can be argued that 
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 when studying existing material the ideals of objectivity that traditionally 
has been formulated by methodologists only can be partly met when 
conducting concrete research (Ibid. 13). Which is also another reason to 
why normative analysis traditionally has been met by widespread 
suspicion. The above argument is acknowledged in this study and the 
relevance of context and interpretation is as previously mentioned key in 
this analysis, which is evident of the somewhat relativistic stance taken in 
the theoretical considerations. Hence, I as a researcher am clear about the 
ontological and epistemological stance, which is the first requirement in 
order for the analysis to be valid and reliable. There are further 
requirements in order to increase the validity and reliability of a normative 
analysis, and the main ones that must be taken into consideration are: 
Precision, reproducibility and internal relevance, i.e. first, to enable the 
reader of the thesis to understand the logics behind the argumentation it is 
important to be precise and use clear definitions. Also, the normative 
analysis should be reproducible in the sense that the analysis is based on 
openly declared principles. Lastly, it is important that only arguments 
relevant to the subject are used (Badersten 2006:104). The aim is not to 
“win over” the reader, merely to present a valid argumentation according 
to the normative logic used in the thesis. 
The method used in the normative analysis is to theoretically argue 
on the basis of the previously mentioned premise of the liberal principle 
(as in individual autonomy), for the normative stance that cultural variance 
should be accepted as long as the premise of liberal freedom, with the 
obligations that come with this freedom, is fulfilled. The argumentation 
aims to show that on the basis of the normative logic used, the examples 
of religious/cultural symbols in public schools and work places should be 
accepted in the context of a liberal society, and that the same goes for the 
more controversial issue of polygamy. On the basis of the same premise, it 
will be evident in the argumentation that the other two examples included 
(female circumcision and underage marriage) cannot and should not be 
accepted.  
The argumentation used bares some similarities to normative 
arguments within other areas of research, e.g. one argument used by 
Michael Walzer concerning when war can be justified and when it cannot, 
is that states have the right of territorial integrity and political sovereignty 
(Walzer 1977:53). It is possible to draw some parallels to the 
argumentation used in this thesis from the argumentation Walzer uses, the 
difference being that in this case the concern is not the sovereignty or 
integrity of the state, but of the human individual. This is one example of 
how the logic and structure of the arguments presented in this thesis can 
be seen as familiar within the field of political science. Allen Buchanan 
also uses similar argumentation in the book “Secession” (1991) where he 
uses normative argumentation for under what conditions secession can be 
morally justified (Buchanan 1991). On the basis of the premise of this 
thesis, a similar form of argumentation that both Walzer and Buchanan use 
17 
 for their research purposes is applied on the research question in this 
study, i.e. when is it justified for an individuals belonging to a minority to 
claim certain rights with reference to culture?  
An important aspect to normative analysis is to also address 
counter-arguments that can be made against the argumentation presented 
(Badersten 2006:49), this too will be done in connection with the 
argumentation. However, it is relevant to remember that even though it is 
possible to formulate counter-arguments against any and every argument 
presented in normative studies in general, when the purpose is a normative 
analysis in a scientific manner, what is most important is that the analysis 
is systematic and follows the logic and the premises that have been 
defined in advance. Hence, a counter-argument is only valid if it does the 
same (follows a scientific normative logic). Consequently, even though 
the counter-argument would be equally valid, it does not mean that the 
validity and/or reliability of the original argument necessarily decreases or 
is any less valid.  
 4.1  Definitions 
1. Culture: The collective that is a culture is in this study viewed as a 
civic construction of a common identity. A culture being a constructivist 
type of collective that provides a sense of cultural identity for individuals 
that perceive themselves to be part of the collective. In this view a culture 
is a historically developed construction that is based on shared traditions, 
rules as well as institutional arrangements. Hence, a culture is not seen as 
a natural construction, but as a collective where boundaries can be diffuse 
and undefined, and (in contrast to the primordial view), a culture is not 
according to this civic view seen as an entity that is unchangeable and 
hostile to differences and other cultures, which means that individuals 
have the ability to evaluate and also cross cultural boundaries, which 
enables cultures to change and evolve over time. “Strangers” are not 
automatically perceived as a threat to the collective, or as incomparably 
different and because cultural boundaries can be diffuse, it is possible for 
individuals to enter and/or exit cultures (Tempelman 1999:17-18 
modified). 
 
2. Cultural Identity: The identification with a societal culture that 
provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the range of 
human activities, which includes social, educational, religious as well as 
recreational life, in both public and private spheres, including shared 
traditions and conventions (Kymlicka 1995:76, modified). It is recognized 
in this thesis that cultural identity can be very complex and that 
individuals can belong to multiple cultures e.g. and also that cultural 
identity can be fluid and that how individuals perceive their cultural 
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 identity can differ not only from person to person but also from time to 
time. It can even be said that fluidity is in the nature of the concept of 
“cultural identity”, however this does not cause a problem for the main 
argumentation presented in this study. Since the normative argumentation 
is based on and therefore only relevant with regards to individuals that 
perceive themselves to belong to a certain minority culture that potentially 
practice traditions and conventions that differ from the traditions of the 
majority culture.  
Part of the defense of cultural rights is by the above definition 
based on that as members of a cultural community, individuals acquire 
certain tendencies and dispositions, which can be as deep as those they are 
deemed to possess by nature (Parekh 2006:122), which is why culture and 
cultural identity matters.  
 
3. Western liberal democracy: “Democracy” is in this study defined 
as the rule of the people, a system for choosing government through free 
and fair elections at regular intervals (Diamond in Dahl et. al. (ed.) 
2003:30). However, the concept “liberal democracy” contains much more 
and is here defined as a political system in which individual as well as 
group liberties are (should be) well protected and where there exists a 
sphere of private life which is insulated from state control, where in 
addition to “…the minimization of violence in political life and of 
arbitrary action by government…” liberty is considered a basic good and 
“… the freedoms of the individual to think, believe, worship, speak, 
publish, inquire, associate, and become informed…” are recognized as 
human rights (Ibid. 31).  
The analytical perspective in the study only deals with cultural 
conflicts within “the West” and all the material is from/on either North 
America or Europe. Hence, the term “Western liberal democracy” is used. 
 
4. The principle of liberal freedom: The negative right of non-
interference as well as the positive right to actually be able to be in charge 
of one’s own life. Together with the distinct obligation that follows at all 
times. I.e. we never have the right to lead our lives so that we impose on 
the rights and freedoms of anyone else, this obligation is as central as the 
above mentioned freedom itself, because if we impose on the right of non-
interference of others, we have imposed on the negative right that the 
freedom principle itself is entirely based on (Badersten 2006:113). 
The positive right of liberal freedom (i.e. the individual right to 
lead one’s own life as one wishes) includes the right to make informed 
decisions, the right to one’s own body, as well as the right to exit a 
culture. The above aspects of liberal freedom are in this study considered 
to be the most relevant ones in relation to the research question regarding 
minority rights.  
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 5 Empirical Examples 
 
 
 5.1  The ban of religious symbols in public schools in 
France 
The French laïcité strongly resists all group rights and based on this 
principle of secularism the French government has banned the wearing of 
religious symbols in public schools and institutions. Even though the ban 
is on all religious symbols, the policy generated a specific controversy 
known as the headscarf controversy, (or the politics of the veil) l´affaire 
du foulard (Koopmans Et. al. 2005:168) One criticism that has been put 
forward in connection with the ban is that in its quest to uphold secularism 
a risk is that the principle of laïcité as put in practice by the French 
government, denies “…the natural space where liberty is given to 
everyone” (Ibid. 170). Critics of the ban of religious symbols also stress 
that laïcité should include the respect for difference; this has been the 
argument of many Muslims that claim the right to wear the headscarf. The 
claim that is made reaffirms the principle of laïcité, but also expresses the 
request of more space for cultural difference. In this way, the argument 
made can be considered a cultural claim, as opposed to only a religious 
claim. Further, the request for acceptance of the headscarf is stressed to be 
a request for the tolerance of culture, not politics (Ibid.). 
The ban of the headscarf can be seen as a part of the return of an 
assimilation policy as opposed to integration policies, and there has been a 
retreat of movements that are in favor of the right to difference (droit à la 
différence) in the recent years in France (Freedman 2004:6). Part of the 
controversy that came with l’affaire du foulard was that the girls that were 
affected by the new policy were often represented by the media as being 
tools of Islamic organizations that were trying to infiltrate or “take over” 
the French society (Ibid.). This is part of the argument that the women and 
girls wearing the headscarf are oppressed in comparison with “liberated” 
Western women (Ibid.).  
This statement will be addressed in the normative argumentation 
further on in the study. It will be evident that it is actually the above 
mentioned Western feminist argument often used in defense of the ban of 
the headscarf that in fact can be viewed as not only oppressive to the 
20 
 women and girls who wish to wear the headscarf, but also a violation of 
the basic civil rights and liberal freedom of the minority. 
The classic answer by liberal states when it comes to culture and 
religion has traditionally been “neutrality” (Joppke 2007:313). However it 
is important to remember that the concept “neutrality” can be very 
multifaceted. There are a variety of stances that “neutrality” leaves space 
for, particularistic and/or universalistic, unity and/or rights-oriented 
stances (Ibid.). Different approaches have been taken in different countries 
considered to be Western liberal democracies. In France, the concept of 
laïcité appears to be so deeply rooted in the majority culture that the state 
does not, nor has in the past, aspired to be or even appear “neutral” to 
culture or religion. The ban on religious symbols seems to represent the 
move towards an even stricter unity stance, i.e. the requirement to blend 
into the majority culture in order to be “French enough”, not only by 
sharing the values and norms of the majority, but also by blending in and 
belonging to the majority culture by looking and dressing a certain way to 
school and other public institutions. And the strict separation between the 
state and religion makes publicly visible association with religion to 
appear problematic because it is viewed as a challenge to the principle of 
laïcité (Koopmans Et. al. 2005:172). However, the demands for rights that 
Muslims in France are making are largely only requests that are defensive, 
i.e. merely a response to what is considered the application (by the 
government) of a universalist and assimilationist approach to cultural 
pluralism (Ibid. 169), these demands are not demands for political rights 
that challenge the laïcité principle. Hence, the group demands for the right 
to wear the headscarf to public schools and institutions are within the 
context of this study viewed to be in line with the liberal principle of 
secularism. Wearing religious or cultural symbols to school or work is not 
in this study considered to be a part of politics in the way that it appears to 
be in the eyes of the French government. Therefore it will be argued that a 
more right oriented stance when it comes to religious or cultural symbols 
should be adapted within the context of a liberal society. And that the kind 
of laïcism where there is no room for cultural or religious variety is not 
desirable in a liberal society, because the right to difference (droit à la 
difference) is in this study considered to be a core principle of liberalism 
that should be accepted by society. Hence, the rights oriented neutrality 
that will be applied in the normative chapter means that the liberal state 
should respect culture variety and that the state should deal impartially 
with its citizens, and not interfere in what kind of life they wish to lead, or 
discriminate what item of clothing is acceptable to wear on one’s head 
when attending public education, when the clothing is an expression of 
identity that (it will be argued) does not cause harm to anyone and is not 
worn for the sake of being offensive to others. By this, it will be evident 
that the tradition of a girl or woman wearing a headscarf does not violate 
the rights of anyone, as long as the defined conditions under which the 
tradition is upheld are fulfilled.   
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  5.2  Polygamy 
 
The term polygamy refers to plural marriage, most often a husband who 
has multiple wives. Several attempts by individuals belonging to cultural 
minorities to continue plural marriages and also to enter new polygamous 
relationships have been made in Western liberal democracies, e.g. in the 
United States and in France (Rendel 2004:128-129). Examples from these 
two countries will serve as the empirical examples on polygamy in this 
study. 
 
5.2.1 Examples from the United States 
There may be several legal consequences with polygamous relationships 
in the United States, e.g. prosecution for bigamy, prosecution for statutory 
rape, and also many complications regarding policies like taxation, health 
insurance and immigration. As early as 1878 a well-known culture conflict 
case concerning Mormon polygamy took place in the state of Utah. In the 
case (Reynolds v. United States 1878) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
the defense of religious freedom is not valid when it comes to polygamy, 
with the argument that if polygamy would continue to be legal, this would 
lead to anarchy and enable people to themselves decide which laws to 
follow and which to ignore. This ruling later led to the lobbying by The 
American Civil Liberties Union in Utah to the national board, in an 
attempt to overrule the policy concerning polygamy, citing the freedom of 
religion defense. The appeal was unsuccessful and polygamy remained 
against the law, however no one was prosecuted for practicing polygamy 
in the state for over forty years after it became illegal (Ibid). Still today, a 
controversy remains not only in Utah, but in other states as well, over the 
legitimacy of polygamy. This was particularly evident in the news 
coverage of the polygamy case in Texas in the spring of 2008. The case 
concerned the sect Yearning for Zion in San Angelo, Texas. Officials 
raided the ranch where the sect resided, and a judge ordered that 416 
children living on the ranch would be kept in state custody 
(http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/20/polygamy.sect/). The Texas 
branch of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) responded to the 
ruling that they were concerned with the human rights of the children and 
their mothers, saying:  
 
“While we acknowledge that Judge Walther's task may be unprecedented in 
Texas judicial history, we question whether the current proceedings adequately 
protect the fundamental rights of the mothers and children," Terri Burke, 
executive director of the ACLU of Texas, said in a written statement. 
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 "As this situation continues to unfold, we are concerned that the constitutional 
rights that all Americans rely upon and cherish -- that we are secure in our 
homes, that we may worship as we please and hold our places of worship sacred, 
and that we may be with our children absent evidence of imminent danger -- have 
been threatened," Burke said.” (Ibid.). 
 
While much of the public controversy regarding the case in San Angelo, 
Texas is not about only polygamy per se, but about the welfare of the 
children living on the ranch, the statement made by ACLU in response to 
the ruling by Judge Walther illustrates somewhat of a conflicting value 
hierarchy. ACLU emphasizes the fact that since from their point of view 
there was no absolute evidence of imminent danger regarding the welfare 
of the children, the state may have violated the basic rights of both the 
children and their mothers by taking them away from their residence by 
force. The value of privacy, freedom of religion and the right of the 
parents to live with their children when there is no proof of imminent 
danger are all according to the view expressed by ACLU superior values 
to the suspicion by the authorities that the children’s’ welfare might be in 
danger whilst living on the sect’s ranch. The ruling of the judge on the 
other hand, illustrates the view that a suspicion on probable terms is 
enough in order for it to be justified for the authorities to remove the 
children from the ranch. 
The examples presented above will be further analyzed in the 
normative part of the study. However, it can be stated already here that 
since it is a given that the children by being minors did not have the ability 
to exit the culture (the sect) on their own, and since it is also unclear 
whether the mothers had the ability, or even the right to exit or not, this 
alone can be viewed as reason enough for the authorities to take care of 
the children when there is a probable suspicion of abuse, it will be argued 
on the basis of the normative theory applied in the analysis. As for the 
polygamous relationships practiced within the sect, similar normative 
arguments based on the previously defined criteria will be applied, i.e. 
polygamous relationships practiced by minority cultures should only be 
accepted within the liberal democratic society when the criteria defined in 
previous chapters of this study are fulfilled. 
 
5.2.2 Example from France 
In the 1980’s the French government gave permission to immigrant men 
to bring multiple wives when moving to France (Okin 1999:9). It is 
difficult to assess how many polygamous families there are in the country, 
some say fewer than 10000 while some estimate around 20000 (Haddad & 
Smith 2002:153). In 1995 the former immigration minister of France made 
a statement where he said that up to 200000 people where living in 
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 polygamous families (Ibid.). Emigration to France, from mostly the 
former French colonies in Africa, has presented a variety of problems for 
the families concerned, ranging from open discrimination to the fact that 
most apartments in France are designed for smaller families, which means 
that polygamous families live in extremely crowded apartments (Ibid.). In 
practice, polygamy among immigrants was tolerated in France until 1993, 
when a new immigration act was introduced which included the 
instruction to refuse to grant or renew residence permits for those living in 
a polygamous relationship, whether they were legally married or not in 
their home countries (Freedman 2004:114).  
One common argument used by the French government when 
outlawing polygamy, after first accepting it among immigrants for several 
decades was, (in addition to the fact that polygamy does not fit the model 
of traditional marriage) that polygamy is bad for women. This is the 
feminist argument and it can be argued that there is a widespread 
consensus not only among feminists, but in Western societies as a whole 
that since polygamous relationships among immigrants in the West as a 
rule consist of one husband and his multiple wives, the “polygamy 
problem” in the West can be regarded as a gender issue per nature. 
However, in the case of immigrants in polygamous relationships in 
France, it can be considered quite a paradox that the new policy of 
restriction, which came to be with the argument that it was a defense of 
women’s' rights, in reality has led to devastating practical consequences 
for many of the women (Ibid.) By outlawing polygamy the rights of the 
women has not been defended, on the contrary their living situation has 
drastically worsened because now they are illegal immigrants. The new 
law meant that husbands were forced to reject all wives except one in 
order to have the possibility to renew their residence permits, this meant 
that only the husband and the chosen one of his wives were able to stay in 
the country legally, while the rest of the wives were suddenly stripped 
away of their rights and residence permits, left with the options to either 
be deported to their country of origin, or to hide and stay in France 
illegally (Ibid.).  
It is recognized in this thesis that many times, polygamous 
relationships can be harmful to especially women, and that the feminist 
argument against polygamy is valid in many cases. However, in the above 
case with the “polygamy problem” in France, it will be argued that the 
new French policy that meant the loss of the wives' legal status in the 
country was a direct violation of their rights and caused them direct harm. 
It is not argued in this study that polygamous relationships are ideal, or 
even desirable, the argument put forward is merely that when certain 
criteria is fulfilled, polygamy should be granted to cultural minorities that 
wish to practice it, with the argument that the practice of polygamous 
marriages between consenting adults does not violate the liberal rights of 
anyone, neither the minority/ies nor the majority. In addition to this the 
argumentation also includes cases like the French example, where the 
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 (previously defined) liberal rights of the women are violated when direct 
harm is caused by a new policy that changes the law, and the above 
example will be further analyzed in the normative part of the study.  
 
 
 
 5.3  Female circumcision 
 
Female circumcision (also known as female genital surgery or female 
genital mutilation) is a cultural custom that involves the removal of some 
or all of a girl/woman's external genitalia. The custom has existed for 
thousands of years and is prevalent in Africa and the Middle East, but also 
in Islamic Indonesia, South America and Australia. It is estimated that 
approximately 85 to 114 million currently living girls and women in the 
world have been circumcised (Renteln 2004:51). No religion requires the 
surgery; therefore the custom is treated as a strictly cultural tradition in 
this study. In Europe, the custom has been previously unknown, however 
by migration the number of individuals that belong to cultural minorities 
living within the West and practicing the tradition is growing (Ibid.51-52). 
There are many cultural arguments that are traditionally presented 
in defense of female circumcision, e.g. that it guarantees virginity before 
marriage and chastity afterwards and that it is a rite of passage for girls, 
which means that without being circumcised, a girl will not be able to 
marry, and if unmarried, she will be a social outcast. However, the 
resistance against the custom is growing within many countries where 
female circumcision is practiced, e.g. in Sudan as well as in Kenya, the 
respective governments have banned the custom (Ibid. 52). In some 
countries in the West, e.g. in the United States a federal law specifically 
criminalized all forms of female genital mutilation. Special laws that 
forbid female circumcision have been contended, with the argument that 
already existing legislation in Western liberal democracies can be utilized 
instead. This is also the argument in the normative part of the thesis, since 
it is argued based on liberal human rights that female circumcision cannot 
be accepted within the liberal society, on the basis that it causes direct 
bodily harm and violates the individual freedom of choice to make 
informed decisions, since the surgery is performed on children who cannot 
decide for themselves, nor have the ability to exit the culture. Key for this 
argument is that since the procedure is irreversible, it means that the girls 
can never fully exit the culture and lead their lives as the wish in the future 
either. This makes circumcision distinctly different from other cultural 
choices that parents make for their children (like choices about what 
clothing children wear e.g., as in the example with the headscarf), because 
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 when parents (or other relatives) make the decision to circumcise the girls, 
it is a decision about the girls body that she will have to live with for life, 
never having the freedom to re-evaluate the custom for herself later in life, 
which is possible with other cultural traditions, such as the example of the 
headscarf. 
The counterargument, in defense of additional legislation, is that a 
specific law against the custom serves to clarify the status of female 
circumcision and making it clear that cultural custom cannot justify the 
procedure, this has been the purpose of the federal law in the United 
States, to serve as a largely symbolic law (Ibid. 53).  
The international strategy has been to condemn female 
circumcision on the basis that it is unhealthy and this is true regarding the 
way the procedure has traditionally been performed; it has often led to 
severe health complications. However a problem with using solely this 
argument in the condemnation of the custom is that with the use of 
modern medical techniques, it is possible to carry out the procedure under 
highly antiseptic conditions, which means that immigrants living in the 
West could have access to medical care that could limit the risk of health 
complications from the surgery, if the procedure was legal (Ibid. 52).  
The main argument in this study, in addition to the health 
argument, is that female circumcision should be illegal on the basis that it 
violates the rights of the girls, i.e. the right to one’s body that should exist 
in a liberal society. The custom also makes it impossible for them to later 
in life fully exit the culture, since the procedure is irreversible and by this 
has permanently altered their bodies and thus violated the right of the girls 
to chose how to lead their lives in the future. 
 
5.4 Underage/child marriage 
The rules that specify the appropriate age for entering a marriage vary 
from society to society, in many parts of the world, e.g. in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America it is common that girls who are under the age of sixteen 
get married. Also in many societies there is no law that specifies the 
minimum age and instead it is the parents that decide when they consider 
their child to be ready for marriage (Renteln 2004:114-115). In Europe 
and North America, the minimum marriageable age is generally 18 years 
old (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marriageable_age). However, there are 
some variations and in many European countries as well as in regional 
states in Canada and in the United States it is also legal to get married at 
age 15-17 if there is parental consent. While in some countries, e.g. in 
Finland and Sweden, it is not parental consent that is required when 
someone under the age of 18 wants to enter a marriage, but the consent 
from the ministry of justice (Finland) or the county administrative board 
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 (Sweden) when it is a case of “special circumstances”. In France a new 
law was enforced in 2005, with the explicit reason to protect minors from 
arranged child marriages (Ibid.).  In this study (as in most European and 
North American countries) the marriageable age is considered to be 18 
years old, because this is (within the context of this study) when an 
individual is considered to an adult. Further, the normative argumentation 
will include an argument against underage marriage even if there is 
parental consent, (or as in some countries/regions, approval from a judge, 
administrative board or the ministry of justice), for the reason that before 
an individual is an adult, she is per definition dependent on her 
parents/legal guardian, which means that the ability to evaluate and/or exit 
a culture is limited, and if a girl is already married when she enters 
adulthood, there may be a higher risk that the above limitations remain. 
Most cases of underage marriage (or at least the ones that are 
brought to attention) involve the bride/wife being underage, which means 
that cultural conflicts regarding child marriage are arguably a gender issue 
by nature. The motivation of the parents to marry off their daughters at a 
young age is often to ensure their virtue, if the girls stay unmarried too 
long; the fear is that the girls will not be considered suitable for marriage 
according to the cultural norms of their community (Ibid.119). It is when 
couples emigrate and arrive in countries where a minimum age exists that 
difficulties can arise. There are examples of this happening in e.g. the 
United States and in Great Britain Ibid. 116-118).  
However, examples of underage girls entering marriage can also be 
found within for example the United States. One case that caused much 
controversy took place in Southern California, where the Orange County 
Social Services Department helped at least fifteen Latina girls marry adult 
males. The reason the Department cited was that they were concerned with 
the fact that the girls were pregnant, so instead of treating them as victims 
of statutory rape or child abuse, they saw marriage as the “solution to the 
problem”, which meant that the agency recommended this solution to 
juvenile court judges. The cases were treated by the Social Services 
agency as a “cultural issue” because of the fact that virtually all the girls 
were Latinas (Ibid. 117-118, 277). In the state of California the age of 
consent for sexual relations is 18 (http://www.avert.org/aofconsent.htm), 
while there is no specific minimum age for entering a marriage. However, 
those under the age of 18 who wish to get married must receive parental 
consent or the approval of a superior court judge 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marriageable_age). The criteria used by the 
Social Services agency was whether or not the couple consented to 
marriage as well as raising the child together, whether the sex had been 
consensual or not, and whether the girl was dependent on financial support 
from the man (Ibid.117). 
The normative argumentation against child marriage in this study 
will largely follow the same lines as the argumentation against female 
circumcision. Because even though the premise in this study is that liberal 
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 societies must be sensitive to culture, it must at the same time handle 
cultural conflicts involving children with extra care in order to uphold the 
rights of children. Within the context of this study, children are not 
considered to have the ability to protect their own rights, or choose if they 
wish to enter a marriage or not, especially younger children. Children also 
lack the ability to exit the culture, simply because children are dependent 
on their parents or other legal guardian/s.  
Therefore it is in this study considered to be somewhat of a moral 
difference between arranged marriages where both the bride and groom 
are adults, and arranged marriages involving minors. Because even though 
arranged marriages between adults may not be consensual, it is argued that 
an adult per definition has a better possibility of making intellectual and 
informed decisions, than a child, an adult also stands a higher chance to 
evaluate a culture and possibly also exit a culture. This is why the tradition 
of underage marriage (and not arranged marriages in themselves) is 
included as an example of cultural conflict in this study. This specific 
example also illustrates why cultural conflicts involving children should 
be handled with extra care and just like in the previously mentioned 
example with the children belonging to the polygamous sect in Texas, it 
will be argued that the value of protecting the liberal rights of children is 
always superior to the value of cultural rights, since children per definition 
(by being dependent on adults) do not have the full ability to protect their 
own rights.  
 
 
 
 
  
    
 
 
28 
 6    Normative analysis 
The four kinds of cultural variance that has been presented in the previous 
chapter are very different, although they do also bear some similarities. 
When it comes to all four cultural traditions it is possible to cite the 
“cultural defense”, however, it is in this study argued that the argument of 
cultural defense only is valid when it comes to two of the examples; The 
right to wear the headscarf to public schools and other institutions, and the 
right to practice polygamy when all parties involved in the relationship are 
consenting adults. 
First, the right to wear the headscarf is in this study considered to 
be fundamentally different from the other two examples that involve 
children or minors (female circumcision and child marriage), which will 
be evident in the normative argumentation that follows.  
6.1 Argumentation against the ban of the headscarf 
(and other religious symbols) in public schools 
and institutions in France 
 
The headscarf policy affects both adult women (e.g. teachers and other 
staff) as well as underage girls who are students in public schools. 
Regarding adult women it is simply a matter of the liberal principle of 
freedom as defined in this study. If a woman wishes to wear the headscarf 
she should have the right to do so based on this principle, and then the 
action does not violate the rights of anyone. When it comes to students in 
public schools, the girls are children/underage and therefore the 
argumentation regarding them will be somewhat different. 
 
6.1.2 Teachers wearing the headscarf 
In France (as opposed to Germany e.g.), the ban of religious symbols also 
applies for teachers (Gallala 2006:593). When it comes to adult women, 
the right to wear the headscarf is a liberal right that does not violate the 
rights of anyone, as long as a woman is not forced to wear the headscarf. 
Of course it can be argued that there are always cases that can be placed 
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 within the gray area of what is considered to be free choice, i.e. to what 
extent a woman actually has the ability to decide for herself if she chooses 
to wear the headscarf or not, but this can be said for anything, there will 
always be difficult cases. However, this does in no way justify a ban by 
the government that affects every single one of the women who wear the 
headscarf and are part of the faculty or other staff in a public school. The 
policy does not respect the right to difference and forces all of the women, 
no matter how much they wish to wear the headscarf, to remove it. The 
argument that the ban is justified with reference to laïcité is not valid 
according to the normative logic in this study, on the contrary, the ban is 
considered a violation of the basic liberal rights of same women that the 
policy is argued (by supporters of the ban) to protect. Wearing the 
headscarf can be an important expression of identity for many women. In 
contrast to some other symbols, the headscarf is not worn for the sake of 
being offensive to others and by this the headscarf does not cause any 
harm, nor violate the individual rights of anyone. It is not a political 
symbol, and should not be part of politics, as it seems to be viewed to be 
by the French government. The respect for difference is key in a 
multicultural society, and the aspect of laïcité as put in practice by the 
French government is not desirable in a liberal society because it puts a 
clear restriction on the citizens/residents and their freedom to lead their 
life as they wish. The view in this study is that the right to have the choice 
to wear a headscarf or not is a right that should be accepted on the basis of 
the liberal principle of freedom, and that the ban is viewed as an attempt to 
further implement a form of assimilation that is not in line with the 
principles of liberalism, as applied in this study. A society that is hostile to 
cultural pluralism is not considered desirable, when the form of pluralism 
that is advocated is consistent with liberal principles. 
The argument that the headscarf is oppressive to women that is 
often used in defense of the ban (Freedman 2004:6) is simplistic and often 
invalid, and is not respectful to cultural difference. The women who wish 
to wear the headscarf and by this lead their life according to their cultural 
norms should always have the right to do so, and it is the policy that takes 
away this right that is oppressive, not the religious/cultural tradition itself. 
It would be possible to argue that immigrant women living within the 
West and still wanting to wear clothing that is specific to their cultural 
norms and traditions, would not choose to do so if they were “liberated” in 
the same way as women within the West have been in the recent decades 
(Ibid.). This argument is in this study considered to be offensive and a 
mere illustration of the assimilationist view that the cultural norms of the 
majority are the only ones that are desirable, or even accepted. When the 
majority society has this kind of assimilationist arguments that in their 
substance only respect and reward the individuals that conform to the 
majority norms, minority cultures clearly lack the capacity to maintain 
their culture (Parekh 2006:166). A society can never be entirely neutral, 
the majority culture will always be the norm, however a liberal society 
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 should strive for a right-oriented neutrality, which means that the liberties 
of all citizens/residents should be protected, and includes that no one 
should be discriminated against because of the fact that they do not fit into 
the majority norm. It is argued here that the ban of religious symbols as 
the headscarf is not consistent with this kind of rights oriented neutrality, 
because it clearly alienates the women who wear the headscarf and means 
that they are excluded to work within the field of public education.    
A symbol or a piece of clothing that represents religious or cultural 
belonging can never in itself be oppressive, it is only when the individual 
lacks the ability to make decisions for herself and to evaluate if the 
tradition is worth to uphold or not, that cultural clothing or symbols may 
become oppressive.    
     
6.1.3  Students wearing the headscarf 
As a general rule in at least liberal democratic societies, it is the parents 
(or other legal guardian/s) that choose what clothing their children wear. It 
is the parents that generally buy the clothes and have the power to decide 
what clothing is proper attire for their children. As long as the choice of 
clothing cannot be classified as abuse, i.e. as long as it does not cause 
harm to the child, this is the right of the parents in a liberal society. It is 
argued here that the headscarf cannot be considered abuse or a violation of 
the rights of children, just because the French government has 
implemented a policy that says so. The clothing we wear is most often a 
direct reflection of our cultural belonging and it is considered a liberal 
right to choose what kind of clothing we wish to wear in order to e.g. 
express our cultural identity. It can be argued that there are many kinds of 
clothing that is seen as inappropriate, especially for children to wear, and 
it is recognized here that there are in most societies (a liberal society being 
no exception) many restrictions to what clothing is viewed as appropriate 
or not. Examples of inappropriate clothing can be clothes with offensive 
symbols, or clothes that are too thin and make the child cold, or clothes 
that are too revealing etc. The list could go on and on, depending on the 
existing norms in a society, and in some cases a ban of certain symbols or 
clothing that is viewed inappropriate can be justified. However, it is 
argued here that the headscarf does not fall under the category of harmful 
or inappropriate attire, and that it is the cultural right of Muslim parents to 
choose if their child should wear a headscarf to school or not. It is not 
argued here that it is desirable for parents to make their children wear a 
piece of clothing that they do not wish to wear, of course it would be ideal 
if it is only the children that express their will to wear a headscarf that do 
so. However, parents make decisions for their children all the time (and it 
is their legal right to do so), and since it is in this study argued that 
children/minors cannot fully make informed decisions or evaluate their 
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 culture in the way that adults can, because minors are dependant on their 
parent/s or other legal guardian/s, the decision that a minor should wear 
the headscarf is here considered to be the equivalent to a parent choosing 
other pieces of clothing for their children to wear. By this it cannot be 
considered a violation of the rights of the children/minors, nor any other 
individual or group, if students wear a headscarf to school. 
 It is when children become adults that they must have the freedom 
to evaluate if they wish to continue wearing certain cultural clothing or 
not. Wearing clothing that is an expression of cultural belonging when one 
is young does not in itself hinder the possibility or opportunity to later in 
life decide to stop wearing it. Just like girls who e.g. have not been 
allowed to wear the headscarf, might as well decide to do so when they 
become adults. This is a key factor in the normative argumentation made, 
if the cultural tradition that parents decide for their children to follow 
while they are minors does not cause harm, nor affect the individuals 
opportunity to lead their lives as they wish when they become adults, it is 
not a violation of the child’s liberal rights. Further, the argumentation that 
the French government used when implementing the ban (see chapter 5: 
Empirical Examples), i.e. that the headscarf is a threat against secularism 
is not considered valid in this normative analysis. It is recognized here, in 
accordance with the French government, that there is no place for religion 
within politics. However, the wearing of headscarves and other 
religious/cultural symbols in public schools is not in any way considered a 
threat against secularism within the context of this study. Cultural clothing 
is not a threat to liberal politics. It is only by implementing the ban that the 
French government made it a political issue, which in its turn led to the 
infected political debate, as well as the whole discussion regarding cultural 
group claims mentioned in chapter 5, and for the reasons stated, the ban is 
considered to not only be a violation of the liberal rights of the women and 
girls who wear the headscarf, but also of the rights of the minority 
community as a whole.  
 
 
6.2 Argumentation regarding polygamy 
Polygamy is not legally accepted in Western liberal democracies today, 
nor is it culturally acceptable within the majority culture. However, 
individuals who belong to minority cultures have on several occasions 
cited the “cultural defense” in the attempt to continue their polygamous 
marriages, and also to enter new ones, e.g. in the United States and France 
(Renteln 2004:128-129), where the examples in this study are from. In 
addition to immigrants who wish to continue their polygamous marriage in 
their new home country, there are also cases that do not concern 
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 immigrants, but minorities within the country who cite e.g. religious 
beliefs and wish to enter polygamous relationships. This is the case with 
the Mormon example in Texas that is analyzed as an example in this study. 
The second example included concerns Muslim immigrants in France. 
   Regarding the example of the Mormon sect (see chapter 5, section 
2.1) the argumentation against the polygamous relationships within the 
sect was highly about the welfare of the children living on the ranch and 
not about only about polygamy per se. One reason for inclusion of the 
above example in this study was to illustrate the fact that polygamy is not 
only a cultural conflict that arises because of migration, which also the 
historical example mentioned in the same section illustrates. The 
argumentation here concerning the case of the Mormon sect (Yearning for 
Sion) in Texas differs slightly from the argumentation concerning the 
French example, however the arguments are based on the same normative 
logic as well as the same premises. As previously mentioned, the rights of 
children need special protection by the liberal society for the reason that 
children lack the ability to protect their own rights. The children living on 
the sect’s ranch are (since they are minors) dependent on their parents, 
which means that the possibility to by themselves exit the culture is/was 
very limited. It is also unclear whether their parents had the ability to do 
so if the welfare of their children was in danger, or the right to do so for 
any reason. According to the normative premises in this study, the right, as 
well as the actual ability to exit a culture is part of the liberal principle of 
freedom that must be respected in a liberal society. It is here argued that a 
suspicion on probable terms that the welfare of children is in danger is 
enough reason for authorities in a liberal society to temporarily remove the 
children from the ranch and keep them in state custody. Thus the value 
that when there is probable suspicion that children suffer harm is superior 
to the rights of the parents, since no individual is ever justified to lead 
his/her life in a way that causes infringes on the rights of others, and 
children themselves cannot fully protect their own rights. Important to 
remember though is that it is not argued in this thesis that growing up in a 
polygamous family in itself causes harm to a child. 
  When it comes to the French example (see chapter 5, section 2.2) it 
is here argued that the policy implemented by the French government 
caused direct harm to the individuals concerned. After tolerating 
polygamy among immigrants for several decades, the new immigration act 
that was introduced in 1993 meant that husbands who had several wives, 
were forced to reject all but one in order to be able to stay in France 
(Freedman 2004:114). This meant that the status of the wives that were 
rejected suddenly turned them into illegal immigrants. It is quite a paradox 
that the new policy of restriction came to be with the argument (among 
others) that it was needed in order to protect the rights of the women, 
when in reality the policy led to devastating consequences for the very 
same women it was supposed to protect (Ibid.). By outlawing their 
marriages, the rights of the women were not protected; on the contrary, it 
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 is argued here that the policy was a violation of the liberal rights of the 
women, as well as of the liberal rights of their husbands. The feminist 
argument that polygamy in itself is harmful to women is rejected in this 
analysis. It is recognized that there of course are cases when the argument 
is valid, however this does not mean that it is always the case and the 
argument that women who belong to cultural minorities never would 
choose to enter polygamous marriages if they were “enlightened” in the 
way that Western women are, is here (just like in the case with the 
headscarf) considered simplistic and offensive, because it is not sensitive 
to cultural variation. No one can say what someone would choose or not 
choose, except the individual herself. And it is not within the context of a 
liberal society justified for anyone else to judge or decide how an 
individual chooses to live his/her life, just because we do not understand 
the choices that are made. Today, many liberal democracies are more 
accepting than ever before when it comes to family formations that differ 
from the norm that is a marriage between one man and one woman. E.g. 
gay marriage is up on the political agenda in many countries today, and 
even legalized in some liberal democracies. In the same way that it should 
be the liberal right of the individual to enter a marriage with someone of 
the same sex, it should be the right of the individual to enter a marriage 
with more than one individual, as long as it is a union between consenting 
adults. Neither gay marriage nor polygamy is a threat to, or affect the 
liberal rights of others, and therefore it is not justified within the context 
of a liberal society to deny individuals to have the right to enter gay or 
polygamous marriages if they wish to do so. Hence, there are parallels that 
can be drawn between polygamous marriages and gay marriage, the 
difference being that gays are not a cultural, but a sexual minority, while 
individuals who wish to practice polygamy belong to cultural minorities, 
which is why the concept of “cultural rights” is relevant. 
 
6.3 Argumentation against female circumcision 
Female circumcision can never be justified within the context of a liberal 
society because it is a violation of the liberal rights of the girls that the 
procedure is performed on. It is argued here that the tradition is in many 
ways fundamentally different from many other decisions that parents make 
for their children. The tradition causes direct bodily harm and often leads 
to severe health complications for the girl (Renteln 2004:53). However, 
even if the conditions that the procedure is performed under is sterile and 
minimizes the risk of health complications, it is still on the basis of the 
normative logic in this study considered to cause bodily harm because 
female circumcision is irreversible and therefore permanently alters a girls 
body, meaning that it can never function in a way that it would have if the 
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 removal of (some or all) the external genitalia would not have taken place. 
The right to one’s body is a fundamental right always superior to the value 
of cultural tradition, thus the “cultural defense” argument can never be 
valid when it comes to traditions that ignore said right. Once the procedure 
is done, the girl looses all freedom to later in life re-evaluate the custom, 
since it can never be undone. Parents do not have the right to abuse their 
children, and therefore the liberal society should never accept a tradition 
that can be classified as physical abuse. The above argument can be used 
regarding other forms of physical abuse as well, e.g. when a possible 
cultural defense is presented in cases where parents have used corporal 
punishment when disciplining a child. However, when it comes to female 
circumcision it is a case of physical damage that can never heal, and 
therefore here considered to be an even more serious violation of 
individual rights than corporal punishment. 
  The legislation in the United States that specifically outlaws all 
forms of female genital mutilation was put in place to largely serve as a 
symbolic law (Ibid.) It is here argued that special legislation is not 
necessarily needed, given that there already are existing laws that can be 
utilized. However, legislation that outlaws the tradition is not enough. 
Information and further education regarding the damages that the tradition 
causes is crucial in order to enable individuals within cultural minorities 
that practice the tradition to themselves evaluate the tradition, which can 
be a step towards the cessation of the practice in the future, if not among 
first generation immigrants, then potentially among the second or third 
generation.  
  Children have individual rights that are not connected to their 
parents and it is when these rights are not respected by the parents or other 
legal guardian/s or family members that society has the distinct 
responsibility to step in and actively prevent that harmful cultural 
traditions are continued in the new home country. Further, it is not only 
within the context of Western liberal democracies that the procedure is 
condemned; many countries where female circumcision traditionally has 
been practiced have banned the custom, e.g. Sudan in 1945 and Kenya in 
1982 (Ibid.), which indicates a growing consensus in other parts of the 
world as well that it is not desirable that the tradition is upheld, although it 
is by migration to Europe and the practice of the tradition by cultural 
immigrants within the West that arguably has contributed to the 
recognition of the problem and increased the debate regarding the 
tradition. 
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 6.4 Argumentation against underage/child marriage 
Much of the normative argumentation against child marriage follows the 
same line of argumentation as in the case of female circumcision in this 
study. The cultural defense is not valid when it comes to the tradition of 
child marriage, thus it is argued here that child marriage can never be 
justified within the context of a liberal society. In this study the 
marriageable age is considered to be 18 years old, since this is when an 
individual legally is an adult. It is argued that parents do not have the right 
to marry off minors because the tradition is a violation of the individual 
rights of the children; hence the decision to enter a marriage cannot 
justifiably be made by parents for their children. The choice to enter a 
marriage should be done by the individual herself and thus cannot/ should 
not be made until the individual is an adult. As long as an individual is a 
minor, she is per definition legally dependent on her parents, which means 
that she is unable to make legal decisions for herself. For this reason the 
decision to grant a marriage when someone is a minor should not be made 
by judges, administrative boards or the ministry of justice either.  
Underage marriage is in this study considered to be harmful to 
children, although the harm may differ somewhat from the harm caused by 
female circumcision. Even though underage marriage arguably does not 
cause irreversible bodily harm as in the example of female circumcision, it 
still is a tradition that here is considered to cause harm for several reasons. 
First, even though a marriage is not necessarily irreversible, the 
opportunity to re-evaluate or exit the culture is arguably lower if a child is 
already married when she becomes an adult, which means that the 
opportunity to live her life as she wishes when she becomes an adult is 
more limited than it would have been if the decision to marry would have 
been made later in life.  
Secondly, even if the minor would consent to the marriage, as in 
the cases of the Latina girls in Orange County, California (see chapter 5, 
section 3) the decision is per definition done under circumstances where a 
minor is dependent on adults who are responsible for her welfare. If a 
child enters a marriage with an adult, parents (arguably) cannot guarantee 
the welfare of their child since the child then is (in addition to her parents), 
in a dependent situation in the relationship with her husband. The 
vulnerability significantly increases when one party in a marriage is a 
child while the other is an adult, which often is the case in arranged 
marriages, as seen in the cases with the Latina girls in California e.g. 
Thirdly, the right to ones own body is fundamental in the principle 
of individual rights and a child has no to very little possibility to defend 
said right when it comes to sexual relations in a marriage.     
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 7 Conclusion 
It is argued in this study that the principle of tolerance is as important in a 
society as the principle of freedom, and that the two cannot exist 
separately. Thus, tolerance of cultural variation is crucial in liberal 
societies. However, there is a limit to how far the tolerance of cultural 
variation should go, and to define criteria regarding when minorities have 
the right to claim cultural rights, and consequently when a cultural defense 
cannot be justified, has been the purpose of this study. 
It is illustrated in the analysis how Western values often can be 
inaccurately equalized with the concept of liberal values, which is in this 
study viewed as an example of how the concept of “liberalism” can be 
wrongfully used when implementing policies that in reality actually are 
illiberal, as in the example of the French government and the ban of the 
headscarf, or in the example concerning polygamy, since there is nothing 
within the theory or political order of liberalism that says that polygamous 
relationships should not be accepted. The outlawing of female 
circumcision and underage marriage on the other hand is in line with 
liberalism and fall under the category of cultural variation that should 
never be accepted.  
The “social imaginary” that the majority norms are the only 
desirable ones in a society causes harm and multiculturalism benefits not 
only the minority culture but the society as a whole, as long as the cultural 
claims made by minorities are in line with the criteria defined, i.e. the 
liberal principle of freedom with all the responsibilities that come with 
said freedom. The Western order must in a true liberal sense accept 
differing cultural as well as religious traditions (Dallmayr 2002:104) and 
this is even more important when it is a question of individuals from 
differing cultures co-existing within the same society, which due to 
migration makes the research subject all the more relevant to study. It is 
crucial though for the liberal society to actively work and prevent that the 
cultural defense is used in cases where there is a risk that the individual 
rights are violated. The cultural defense is possible to present in a variety 
of cases concerning cultural traditions. The cases chosen to be included in 
this study are just a few of possible controversial issues. There is a broad 
spectrum of potential cultural conflicts that can be studied in a scientific 
manner, cases that relate to the problematic discussed in this thesis, i.e. 
traditions that concern children, attire, or marriage. There are also a 
variety of other areas where cultural conflict may occur, how to treat 
animals or the dead e.g. 
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 In the illustration of how a liberal order calls for the respect of 
differing cultures, all the while there is a responsibility to protect 
individual rights; it is evident that sometimes it can be a fine balance. 
There is always a gray area within all models or guidelines and there are 
always difficult (if not impossible) cases when it comes to determining if a 
cultural defense is valid of not. However, when it comes to cases 
involving female circumcision or child marriage the guidelines presented 
in this study are absolute in their nature, since it is argued that it can never 
under any circumstances be culturally justified to circumcise girls/women 
or to marry off a child, because both traditions involve such a fundamental 
violation of individual rights. The argument related to the above traditions 
also includes the strong normative stance that the rights of children require 
special attention since children lack to ability to defend their liberal rights. 
Regarding cultural or religious attire it is argued that a ban of 
cultural clothing cannot be justified in a liberal society and that countries 
that have enforced the ban, such as France (where the examples in this 
study are taken from) or Germany, violate the liberal rights of the 
minorities who wear cultural or religious clothing. The normative stance 
in this study is that it is possible, as well as desirable that a 
multiculturalism that is visible exists in liberal societies, and cultural 
clothing is not a threat to the separation of state and church, like defenders 
of the ban have argued. It is never justified to automatically presume that 
there is a threat towards the majority just because there exists a visibility 
of individuals who differ from the cultural norm within the public sphere. 
On the contrary, it is necessary in order to ensure the liberal rights and 
freedoms of all individuals in society.    
There is no conflict between liberalism and the importance of 
culture. Culture does matter and can provide an important identification 
with ways of life across the whole range of human activities. A society 
that prohibits the visibility of culture and most importantly differing 
cultures, cannot be called a liberal society.  This means that different ways 
of life across the range of social, educational, religious as well as 
recreational life must be allowed to exist and be visible also within the 
public sphere. It is not acceptable to only tolerate variation that is limited 
to the private sphere. It is recognized in this study that the concept of 
cultures as well cultural identities is fluid by nature, which means that 
cultural identity can be very complex, however this also means that it is 
possible for individuals to cross cultural boundaries and to re-evaluate 
their culture, which in its turn means that cultures evolve over time. The 
ability to re-evaluate cultures and to exit a culture if it is oppressive is, as 
previously mentioned, key for the argumentation in this study. 
The argumentation in the analysis follows the ideology of 
liberalism and thus liberal theory. The theoretical framework also consists 
of value theory, since the argumentation is a normative analysis where a 
value hierarchy is constructed based on the liberal principles defined in the 
study. Hence, the claims that are made are entirely dependent on the 
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 theoretical framework and what is viewed as just on the basis of the liberal 
premises. This means that even though it is possible to make numerous 
counter-arguments against the arguments that are presented in this study, it 
does not take away from the fact that the study does follow a consistent 
scientific logic based on a value relativistic ontology. For this reason, only 
some counter-arguments have been included in the study, mainly 
arguments that have been used as a defense for the ban of the headscarf 
and the practice of polygamy. It has been highlighted in the analysis how 
the arguments used in the defense of the ban of the headscarf as well as in 
outlawing polygamy has been wrongfully presented as arguments that are 
“liberal”, which is an example of how often “Western values” can be 
incorrectly equated with “liberal values”. In fact, most of the arguments 
used in the debate over the headscarf as well as polygamy have been 
feminist arguments, which is why this also is highlighted in the study. It is 
argued in the analysis that neither the headscarf nor the practice of 
polygamy in itself can be oppressive to women and that it therefore cannot 
be justified to enforce legislation against the cultural traditions based on 
the feminist argument. It is only in combination with actual internal 
restrictions, that the tradition of the headscarf or the practice of polygamy 
may be oppressive. There has been a debate as well as a controversy 
regarding the two cultural traditions, especially in France where the 
controversy has been on the political agenda due to immigration. This is 
the reason for the choice of including France (in addition to the United 
States) as an example to illustrate the normative stance. However, the 
cultural conflict does not only exist in the specific country/ies where the 
examples in this study are taken from, it has also been on the political 
agenda in a variety of Western liberal democracies, e.g. in Germany and in 
the U.K., and due to the continuance of migration, it is likely that issues 
that can be regarded as cultural conflicts increase in the years to come. 
This is why it is important to bring attention to them, which has been a 
further aim with this study. 
The reason why more space in the study is given to the traditions of 
the headscarf and polygamy than to female circumcision or child marriage 
is that the first two are considered more controversial, since it can be 
argued that it is more difficult to define which category they (should) fall 
under according to the criteria that is formulated.  
Emphasis is in the analysis put on a more rights oriented liberalism 
that is defined as a “…normative political philosophy, a set of moral 
arguments about the justification of political action and institutions 
(Kymlicka 1989:9) which means that the rights of the minority cannot 
simply be decided by the opinion of the majority. It is not justified to 
outlaw a cultural practice just because the majority culture cannot 
understand the value of it. This is why cultural conflicts should be solved 
by an essential interest of the liberal political order to give an account of 
what peoples’ interests are and then treat these interests with equal 
concern and respect (Ibid.13), which cannot be done if it is only the 
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 majority opinion that decides to what degree cultural variance should be 
accepted or not. This is why it is argued here that an increase of 
individuals representing minority cultures within the political sphere is 
essential in order to ensure the rights of minority cultures. It is key that the 
majority culture gets an increasing understanding of the values of the 
minorities, because values are dependent on context and in order to 
understand differing or conflicting values it is important to understand the 
meanings attached to them by culture. Cultural identity can for some be as 
deeply rooted as other traits of the individual that can be viewed as “given 
by nature”, which is part of why cultural traditions must be accepted in a 
liberal society as long as the actions of the group or the individual do not 
infringe upon the rights of others. One’s cultural identity is not given and 
varies not only from individual to individual, but also from time to time, 
which means that cultures are dynamic entities that (arguably) constantly 
change and also intermingle. In order for this to happen, restricting 
legislation that limits the visibility of cultural variance should not be 
adopted, because multiculturalism is here considered to be beneficial for 
the liberal society as a whole, because it increases the freedom of the 
individual, since freedom is intimately linked with, as well as dependent 
on culture (Kymlicka 1995:75). The capacity of people to make informed 
decisions highly depend on access to cultural structure (Ibid.84), and in 
multicultural societies where there is visible cultural variety, the 
opportunity to evaluate the meaning of one’s own cultural values increases 
drastically. One can arguably not make fully informed decisions, nor fully 
evaluate the cultural conditions one lives under, if there is nothing to 
compare with. 
The same premises that go for the examples that are brought up in 
this study are also valid when it comes to other cultural conflicts. The 
answer is not to enforce legislation in order to ban cultural traditions as a 
“simple” solution to the “problem”. It is possible to handle potential 
cultural conflicts in other ways, with a more case-to-case approach, as 
long as it is a question of traditions that arguably are not illiberal. It is 
illiberal to enforce a ban that outlaws cultural expression and the 
opportunity to lead one’s life as one wishes. In a liberal society this should 
not be accepted, because as long as one does not cause harm to others, it is 
not legitimate for the government to limit the liberty of neither the 
individual nor a group. It is not just to discriminate a minority because of 
their cultural values. Only in cases where illiberal traditions are being 
practiced, is it legitimate to enforce values upon individuals. It might not 
even be the values of the majority, because its possible that in some cases 
there is no consensus among the majority concerning a specific cultural 
tradition practiced by a minority. It is the values of liberalism as defined 
previously in this study that are legitimate to enforce upon individuals or 
groups that do not respect individual rights. 
When it comes to polygamy a case-to-case approach is necessary in 
order to determine if the practice causes harm. This is the approach used 
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 regarding any marriage and there is no reason why polygamous marriages 
should be any different, if there is abuse in a marriage, if there is a 
probable suspicion that the welfare of an individual involved in the 
relationship is at risk, it is legitimate to press criminal charges, and 
legitimate for social services to remove children from their parents if there 
is probable cause that the children suffer harm. This is the practice when it 
comes to any marriage or relationship and the same should go regarding 
polygamous relationships. Living in a polygamous family cannot in itself 
be said to cause harm to a child, there are many children growing up in 
families that do not fit the mold of traditional marriage, e.g. children 
growing up in households with a single parent or children with gay parents 
etc. 
It is here argued that it does not make any sense for secular 
societies to limit the concept of marriage with all its rights and 
responsibilities to what is considered traditional marriage between one 
man and one woman, which essentially is a Christian tradition. It is the 
right of cultures as well as religions to ordain what unions they see fit (as 
long as they are not illiberal), but it is not the right of the government in a 
secular country to discriminate. 
Regarding cultural or religious attire, the same guidelines should be 
applied as with other clothing. Parents have the right to choose how to 
dress their children, at it should be a given that the same rules should 
apply for parents belonging to minority cultures, as the ones that apply to 
those identifying as the majority culture. There are examples where it is 
justified to ban certain attire or symbols within the public sphere, attire or 
symbols that are used for the purpose of racial agitation or that are in other 
ways offensive. In cases like these it is justified to enforce a specific ban 
on certain symbols. However, prohibiting cultural and religious clothing 
or symbols that do not fall under this category, as is the case of most 
cultural and religious clothing, is discriminative and assimilationist, and 
go against the tolerance and acceptance of multiculturalism that should 
exist in every society with the aspiration to call itself liberal. Therefore 
legislation that protects the right to the kind of visible multiculturalism 
that cultural attire entails should be adopted in every liberal society. 
In this way, the right to wear cultural clothing without it being an 
obstacle for participating in public and political life is not a group right for 
specific groups, but an individual right for all individuals that identify 
themselves as part of a minority culture. 
Value conflicts and other normative dilemmas is ultimately what 
make up the entire essence of politics. In this way politics is the 
construction of value hierarchies (Bedersten 2006:29) and with Western 
liberal democracies today being more multicultural than ever before, it is 
necessary to only enforce policies that treat every culture with equal 
respect. In some cases it is necessary to grant specific cultural rights for 
minority cultures that practice cultural traditions that differ from the 
majority norm, i.e. as evident by the example of polygamy. In others it is 
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 simply about granting equal rights to minorities as to the majority, as in 
the example of cultural attire, and in some cases it is crucial to draw the 
line for what should be accepted, as evident by the examples of female 
circumcision and child marriage. What needs to be remembered though, is 
to not make the mistake of automatically equalizing the concept of 
“Western values” with the values of liberalism. 
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 8 Executive summary 
The thesis examines some of the controversial challenges that exist in 
majority/minority relations within the context of Western liberal 
democratic societies. The aim of the study is to construct guidelines that 
are based on a normative value hierarchy concerning when it is justified 
for minorities to cite the cultural defense and claim certain rights with 
reference to cultural variance. 
Four specific examples of existing cultural conflicts are included in 
the study: The ban of religious symbols within public schools in France 
(the Muslim headscarf being the specific symbol discussed in the study), 
polygamy, female circumcision and underage/child marriage. The 
headscarf is treated as a cultural symbol in addition to a religious one and 
the three remaining examples are treated as strictly cultural traditions as 
opposed to religious traditions, because no religion unanimously 
advocates the traditions, even if they are more common within some 
religions than others. 
The examples in the study are from the United States and France 
and were chosen because they in recent years have been on the political 
agenda in these two countries, however there is a variety of similar 
examples of possible cultural conflicts that exist in Western liberal 
democracies today that could have been possible to study, which 
illustrates that there is a broad spectrum of normative dilemmas regarding 
majority/minority relations that can be studied. It is argued in this study 
that it can be possible to apply the normative guidelines constructed in the 
thesis to other cultural conflicts as well, as long as it is within the context 
of liberal democratic societies. It is evident in the study that the four 
examples fall under different categories of cultural variance that should be 
accepted and variance that cannot and should not be accepted. 
The empirical examples serve to illustrate the normative 
argumentation regarding to what extent acceptance of cultural variation 
should be accepted. The guidelines in the study are based on the basis of a 
normative logic constructed with a theoretical framework based on value 
theory and liberal theory. The normative logic is based on that an act 
should be valued with regard to the duties and responsibilities of (in this 
case) the liberal society. This makes the normative logic deontological, all 
though not in its strictest sense. The consequence of the normative logic of 
the study is that cultural variance should only be accepted when the central 
premise of liberal human rights is fulfilled. The ontological stance in the 
study is somewhat relativistic, however only in the sense that values are 
dependant on human influence and thereby the validity of a normative 
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 value argumentation is restricted to the cultural context. Consequently, the 
normative analysis that is performed in this study is limited to the context 
of liberal societies, or societies that have an aspiration to become liberal. 
Liberalism is defined in the study as a political system in which 
individual as well as group liberties are and should be well protected, and 
where there exists a private sphere that is free from state control. The 
principle of liberal freedom that the normative guidelines are based on is 
defined as the negative right of non-interference as well as the positive 
right of actually be able to be in charge of ones own life. In the freedom 
principle there is a distinct obligation that follows at all times, namely that 
we never have the right to lead our lives so that we impose on the rights of 
others. 
Crucial in the study is the premise that culture does indeed matter, 
because the identification with a societal culture can provide its members 
with a meaningful way of life across all human activities, e.g. social, 
educational, religious as well as recreational life. A culture is in the study 
viewed as a civic construction of a common identity that gives a sense of 
identity to individuals that perceive themselves to be part of the collective. 
In this way it is the individual who should have the ability to decide for 
themselves which shared traditions are worth upholding and which are 
not. Hence, a culture is here perceived as a historically developed 
construction with the ability to change and intermingle with other cultures, 
as opposed to a natural construction. 
It is argued with the help of the examples chosen that tolerance of 
cultural variation is equally important in a society as the freedom principle 
is. However, it is stressed that there is a distinct limit to how far the 
tolerance of cultural variation should go. Cultural traditions that are 
illiberal should principally never be accepted.  
It is illustrated in the analysis how the ban of religious symbols 
within the public education system in France is illiberal and it is argued 
that a ban of the headscarf cannot be justified in a liberal society, the 
normative stance taken stresses that it is possible, as well as desirable that 
a multiculturalism that is visible in the public and political sphere exists in 
liberal societies, and that this is not a threat to e.g. secularism. 
The example of polygamy is quite controversial and polygamy is 
not accepted in Western liberal democracies today. It is also an example of 
how it is possible to inaccurately equalize the concept of ”Western values” 
with values that are liberal. There is nothing within liberalism that 
supports the outlawing of polygamy as long as everyone involved in the 
relationship are consenting adults. A parallel is drawn to gay marriage and 
it is argued in the study that it is not justified for the government in secular 
societies to limit the concept of marriage with all its rights and 
responsibilities to what is considered traditional marriage, which 
essentially is a Christian tradition. 
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 The same premises that go for the above mentioned examples are also 
valid when it comes to similar cultural conflicts. The answer is not to 
enforce legislation in order to ban cultural traditions as a ”simple solution” 
to the ”problem”. As long as the traditions practiced arguably are not 
illiberal as defined in the study, a more case-to-case approach is possible 
when handling potential cultural conflicts. It is not justified to discriminate 
a minority on the basis of differing cultural values. However, this 
argument is not valid when it comes to traditions that violate the principle 
of liberal freedom, as evident of the two remaining examples in the study 
(female circumcision and child marriage). 
Value conflicts can be said to make up the essence of politics, 
which makes them highly relevant to study. Especially with liberal 
democracies being more multicultural than ever before. It is necessary to 
treat the majority and minority cultures with equal respect. In certain cases 
it is necessary to grant cultural rights for minorities that practice cultural 
traditions that differ from the majority norm, as in the example of 
polygamy. In other cases it is simply about granting equal rights to 
minorities as to the majority, as in the example of the headscarf. An in 
some cases it is necessary to draw the line for what can be accepted, as in 
the examples of female circumcision and child marriage. Evident in the 
study is that there can be a distinct difference between the concept of 
”Western values” and the values of liberalism, which is relevant to keep in 
mind. 
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